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The Shepard Illusion Is Reduced in
Children With an Autism Spectrum
Disorder Because of Perceptual
Rather Than Attentional Mechanisms
Philippe A. Chouinard1* , Kayla A. Royals1, Oriane Landry1 and Irene Sperandio2
1 Department of Psychology and Counselling, School of Psychology and Public Health, La Trobe University, Melbourne, VIC,
Australia, 2 School of Psychology, University of East Anglia, Norwich, United Kingdom
Earlier studies demonstrate reduced illusion strength in the Shepard illusion in adults
and adolescents with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and in typically developing (TD)
adults with high levels of autistic traits. We measured the strength of the Shepard illusion
in ASD and TD children and tested if ten different eye-tracking measurements could
predict group differences in illusion strength. The ASD children demonstrated reduced
illusion strength relative to the TD group. Despite this, there were no mean differences on
any of the eye-tracking measurements between groups. Even though none of the eye-
tracking measurements revealed mean differences between the two groups, the degree
to which spatial attention was directed toward the standard stimulus, as indexed by
the number of saccades within and toward this stimulus, predicted the strength of the
illusion in the overall sample. Furthermore, this active scanning of the standard stimulus
was found to enhance illusion strength more strongly in the ASD than the TD group.
Together, we conclude that scan patterns and the degree to which participants are
able to shift between different locations in a visual scene did not account for group
differences in illusion strength. Thus, the reduced strength of the Shepard illusion in
ASD does not appear to be driven by how attention shifts or is spatially allocated.
Rather, differences may relate instead to perceptual mechanisms that integrate visual
information. Strategies that may aid ASD individuals to see this illusion more strongly
could have them make even more eye movements within and between the stimuli
presented in the illusion display.
Keywords: autism spectrum disorder, ASD, visual perception, Shepard illusion, eye-tracking
INTRODUCTION
Atypical perception is not included among the diagnostic criteria for autism spectrum disorder
(ASD). Yet, there is an abundance of evidence that children with ASD manifest perceptual styles
that differ from other children. These observations have led to a number of different theories. For
example, the Enhanced Perceptual Functioning (EPF) theory (Mottron et al., 2006) proposes that
perception is more veridical and detailed-focussed in children with ASD and that these differences
play a causal role in many of its symptoms. In contrast, the Weak Central Coherence (WCC)
theory proposes that these same perceptual differences are a consequence of a weakened tendency
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to process and integrate information globally (Happé and Frith,
2006). More recently, Bayesian explanations have been proposed
(Pellicano and Burr, 2012; van Boxtel and Lu, 2013; Lawson et al.,
2014; van de Cruys et al., 2014; Davis and Plaisted-Grant, 2015).
According to these explanations, the child’s past experiences, or
priors, are important in shaping perception (Helmholtz, 1867;
Gregory, 1980) and the use of priors in persons with ASD is
attenuated. Specifically, the active process of formulating and
testing hypotheses about the world is reduced, which results in
greater immunity to suggestion and a tendency to perceive the
world more as it really is.
Illusions offer researchers the opportunity to determine if this
is indeed the case. Most illusions are driven by mechanisms that
are generally helpful for perception but trick us into perceptually
rescaling sensory information in a manner that is unnecessary or
incorrect in a given context, leading to changes in perception that
differ from what is physically present (Gregory, 2015). According
to the above theories, individuals with ASD should perceive
weaker illusions than typically developing (TD) children. The
EPF and WCC theories predict that ASD individuals are
less sensitive to the misleading global contextual cues that
give rise to many visual illusions, resulting in reduced levels
of susceptibility to them. Meanwhile, Bayesian interpretations
predict that individuals with ASD would be less susceptible to
illusions in general, because they are less influenced by prior
experiences and knowledge about the world (Pellicano and Burr,
2012).
A considerable amount of research has been carried out
examining visual illusions in individuals with ASD. However,
results from these studies are mixed (Van der Hallen et al.,
2015). While the first research by Happé (1996) concluded
that children with ASD are less susceptible to most visual
illusions, the majority of studies since this first study have
demonstrated that ASD individuals are just as susceptible to most
visual illusions as TD individuals (Ropar and Mitchell, 1999,
2001; Hoy et al., 2004; Rouse et al., 2004; Schwarzkopf et al.,
2014; Manning et al., 2017). It is unclear to what extent the
heterogeneity in sampling characteristics may have contributed
to these inconsistencies, which is why other studies have re-
examined the strength of various visual illusions as a function
of autistic traits in the TD population (Walter et al., 2009;
Chouinard et al., 2013, 2016). Such an approach serves to model
ASD while reducing confounds related to differences in symptom
severity, cognitive ability, development, and co-morbid disorders
(Landry and Chouinard, 2016).
In the most recent of these studies, Chouinard et al. (2016)
presented a battery of thirteen visual illusions to participants,
and demonstrated that only two were correlated with autistic
traits as measured by the autism quotient (AQ) (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001) questionnaire: the Shepard and square-diamond
illusions. The Shepard illusion is a powerful illusion in which
a parallelogram appears to have a different height and width
when it is rotated 90 degrees (Figure 1A; Shepard, 1990). The
square-diamond illusion is a variant of the Shepard illusion in
which a square appears smaller when it is rotated 45 degrees and
presented as a diamond. Chouinard et al. (2016) demonstrated
a 22 and 5% perceptual difference in size between orientations
in the Shepard and square-diamond illusions, respectively. In
addition, the magnitude of these perceptual differences decreased
as the level of autistic traits increased. These findings converge
well with Mitchell et al. (2010), who demonstrated attenuation in
the strength of the Shepard illusion in a group consisting mostly
of adolescents and adults with ASD. Specifically, their sample
consisted of ASD participants between the ages of 12 to 29 years
(M = 21.1, SD = 5.0).
Given only two out of thirteen illusions demonstrated
a relationship with autistic traits, Chouinard et al. (2016)
questioned the EPF, WCC, and Bayesian theories of perception
in ASD and proposed instead that perceptual styles in ASD
might relate to differences in specific types of high-level visual
integration, such as those implicated in shape processing or
mental rotation, as opposed to a style that privileges local
details over global integration or depends on atypical priors
in an all-encompassing manner. In addition, Chouinard et al.
(2013, 2016) elaborated further that perceptual differences in
ASD might be specific to the processing of contextual elements
embedded within stimuli, which is the case for the Shepard
illusion, as opposed to between stimuli, which is the case for
a number of illusions, including the well-known Ebbinghaus
illusion (Titchener, 1901). Chouinard et al. (2016) argued that
their results could generalize to ASD given that Mitchell et al.
(2010) had previously demonstrated similar effects with the
Shepard illusion in an adolescent / adult population with ASD.
Whether or not similar results could be demonstrated in children
with ASD has never been investigated until now.
There is an alternative explanation that Chouinard et al. (2016)
and all other previous studies on illusions in ASD have not
considered before. Perhaps it could be the case that differences
in how spatial attention shifts and is allocated to different parts
of a visual scene might be the underlying cause for decreases in
illusion strength. It is conceivable that illusions, which depend
on the integration of visual information, may be weaker in ASD
because these individuals either manifest reduced abilities in
shifting attention or attend to different parts of the visual scene.
In the first case, ASD individuals may not see the illusion as
strongly because their eyes move between different locations in
the visual scene differently. In the second case, TD individuals
might direct their attention to certain parts of the display that are
more important to drive the illusion because they find the percept
itself more interesting, which causes the illusion to be stronger.
For these reasons, we considered a number of eye-tracking
measurements. The first series of measurements, consisting of
saccade velocity and saccade frequency, served to index abilities
in shifting attention (Schmitt et al., 2014). We reasoned that
persons with ASD would demonstrate slower and less frequent
saccades relative to TD individuals if their abilities to disengage
and direct their attention to different parts of a visual scene
were reduced. Indeed, a meta-analysis by Landry and Parker
(2013) demonstrated a consensus in the literature for diminished
performance in ASD on the Posner endogenous cueing task,
which gages goal-directed shifts in attention. It has been further
suggested that these impairments in shifting attention might play
an important role in atypical perception (Laycock et al., 2007)
and other symptoms (Laycock et al., 2007; Landry et al., 2009) in
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 December 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 2452
fpsyg-09-02452 December 1, 2018 Time: 14:0 # 3
Chouinard et al. Eye-Tracking and the Shepard Illusion in ASD
FIGURE 1 | Illusion and control matching tasks. The figure displays the illusion and control matching tasks that were examined. The illusion task consisted of the
Shepard illusion (A). The right side of the top panel (A) demonstrates the full visual display with the buttons at the bottom that the participants used to adjust the
comparison stimulus (in this case, the stimulus on the right) to match the standard (in this case, the stimulus on the left). The different tasks (A–E) had similar buttons
and differed by the stimuli presented in the black area and the dimensions that had to be matched. The control tasks consisted of size (B), shape (C), alignment (D),
and luminance (E) matching tasks.
ASD. If this is the case then one might expect to find differences
between ASD and TD groups on these measurements and that
they might correlate with illusion strength.
The next series of measurements arose from a spatial analysis
of where participants attended to in the visual scene. The stimuli
in the Shepard illusion consisted of two parallelograms. We
calculated the proportion of saccades that were made within
each shape, between them, and elsewhere. We had no specific
predictions as to how the allocation of spatial attention might
affect the strength of the illusion given this is the first eye tracking
study on the illusion that we know of. The last measurement,
completion times, served as an index of task engagement. This
measurement was important to consider so we could rule out
the possibility that differences in illusion strength were due to
differences in task engagement.
The present study aimed to determine if the strength of the
Shepard illusion is diminished in ASD relative to TD children
and whether or not this reduction, if present, can be explained
by differences in shifts in attention or where attention is spatially
allocated in the visual scene. To this end, the Shepard illusion
was examined in ASD and TD children while an eye-tracker
recorded eye movements. It was hypothesized that the children
with ASD would demonstrate reduced illusion strength to the
Shepard illusion relative to the TD children, converging with
previous findings in an older sample with ASD (Mitchell et al.,
2010) and TD adults with various degrees of autistic traits
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TABLE 1 | Gender, age, and raw RPM scores for the ASD and TD groups.
ASD TD
N 12 Males 6 Females 12 Males 6 Females
Age
Mean (SD) 11.38 (2.86) 11.38 (2.52)
Range 6.5 – 15.5 6.0 – 14.7
RPM raw score
Mean (SD) 34.72 (11.79) 34.89 (11.09)
Range 9 – 50 14 – 51
Both groups were matched for gender, age, and raw scores on the RPM.
(Chouinard et al., 2016). It was also hypothesized that the group
difference in illusion strength, if present, could be explained by
eye-tracking measurements.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Our sample consisted of 18 individuals with ASD (12 males,
age range 6.5 – 15.5, mean = 11.4) and 18 TD individuals
(12 males, age range 6.0 – 14.7, mean = 11.4) (Table 1).
Originally, we collected data from 23 ASD participants. Two were
excluded from analyses for not completing the task and three
were excluded from analyses due to insufficient eye-tracking
data collection (eye positioning could only be recorded less
than 20% of the time). We recruited the ASD participants
from a summer program for children with learning disabilities
at a major Australian city (Melbourne, VIC). All participants
attended mainstream schools during the school year. The
ASD participants had been diagnosed in accordance with the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV Text
Revision (DSM-IV-TR) (American Psychiatric Association, 2000)
by an independent multidisciplinary team, which included the
use of the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS)
(Lord et al., 1989) and Autism Diagnostic Interview (ADI) (Lord
et al., 1994).
The 18 TD individuals were selected from a sample of more
than 100 children and adolescents from a regional Australian city
(Bendigo, VIC), who completed the same tests as part of a larger
study (not yet published). Those who were best matched to the
ASD participants on age, gender, and raw scores on the Raven
Progressive Matrices (RPM) (Raven et al., 2003) were selected as
controls for this study. The person selecting these participants
(OL) was blind to how the ASD and TD participants performed
on all other tasks. For screening purposes, parents of the TD
participants were asked to indicate if their child had a diagnosis
of ASD or any other neurological or psychiatric condition. All
children in the final sample had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and demonstrated good compliance.
Written informed consent was obtained from a parent or
legal guardian and written assent was obtained from the child
participants. This research was approved by the Australian State
of Victoria’s Department of Education and Training and the La
Trobe University Human Ethics Committee in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki.
Procedures
We used the Tobii Pro TX300 (Tobii AB, Danderyd, Sweden)
system connected to a Dell Precision M6800 mobile workstation
(Dell Inc, Round Rock, TX, United States) to record eye
positioning in Cartesian X, Y coordinates. The screen monitor of
this system was 23 inches with a resolution of 1920× 1080 pixels.
The system captured 300 frames per second and coded each
frame as either a fixation or a saccade. The raw eye-tracking
data was then analyzed in Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA,
United States) using in-house scripts.
Eye tracking began with a brief calibration procedure, which
was always carried out with the participant’s head placed on a
chin rest at a viewing distance of 60 cm. During calibration,
the participant was asked to track with their eyes a red circle
that moved between nine positions on the computer screen (top
left, center and right; middle left, center and right; bottom left,
center and right). After this registration, the system recorded
the data in X, Y Cartesian coordinates relative to the top left
corner of the computer screen in pixels. Following calibration,
the participant completed a series of control tasks (size matching,
shape matching, alignment matching, and luminance matching),
and the Shepard illusion task. All participants performed the
control tasks before the illusion task. Half the participants
completed the RPM before the control and illusion tasks while
the other half did it afterward – the order being randomly
assigned for each individual. The control and illusion tasks were
programmed in Action Script (Adobe Systems, San Jose, CA,
United States) and presented using Flash player (Adobe Systems,
San Jose, CA, United States). The RPM was carried out without
eye-tracking as this task was not computerized.
For both the control and illusion tasks, the participant had to
adjust a comparison stimulus to appear the same along a physical
dimension as a standard stimulus by pressing the Decrease
and Increase buttons displayed on the bottom-left and bottom-
center of the computer screen (right panel in Figure 1A). The
participants were given as much time as they needed to complete
each trial and were asked to press the Done button displayed
on the bottom-right of the computer screen when they felt they
had matched the comparison stimulus to the standard one. The
participants completed one trial for each of the control matching
tasks and four trials for the illusion task. The order of the control
matching tasks was generated randomly for each participant. All
displays had a black background.
The participants were encouraged to base their adjustments
on how the stimuli appeared. At the start of each task, the
experimenter would say something along these lines: “In this
activity, we will be matching different shapes. We want you to
make the two [experimenter would say and point to what features
needed be match] appear the same. You’re going to be make this
one [experimenter points to the comparison] smaller or larger
so it looks like that one [experimenter points to the standard].
This button makes it larger [experimenter points to appropriate
button] and this button makes it smaller [experimenter points to
appropriate button]. Once you’re happy that the two look the same
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 December 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 2452
fpsyg-09-02452 December 1, 2018 Time: 14:0 # 5
Chouinard et al. Eye-Tracking and the Shepard Illusion in ASD
[experimenter would again say and point to what features needed
be matched], press this button [experimenter points to the Done
button].” Slight variations in the instructions were made to the
alignment and luminance matching tasks given that they entailed
matching for orientation and brightness, as opposed to size,
respectively. Further clarification was provided when required.
In the size matching control task, which assessed size
discrimination, the display consisted of two yellow squares
(Figure 1B). The square on the right was designated as the
standard, which remained fixed at 120 pixels in length, while the
square on the left was designated as the comparison stimulus,
which the participant adjusted. The size of the comparison
stimulus began at 180 pixels in length. Scores were obtained
by calculating the final difference in pixels between the fixed
length of the standard and the adjusted length of the comparison
stimulus.
In the shape matching control task, which assessed shape
discrimination, the display consisted of two yellow four-sided
shapes (Figure 1C). The rectangle on the left was designated
as the comparison stimulus while the square on the right was
designated as the standard stimulus. The height and width of
the standard remained fixed at 120 pixels. The width of the
comparison remained fixed at 120 pixels while the height was
adjusted by the participants so that it matched the standard. The
height of the comparison stimulus began at 60 pixels. Scores
were obtained by calculating the final difference in pixels between
the fixed height of the standard and the adjusted height of the
comparison stimulus.
In the alignment matching control task, which assessed
abilities in Verner acuity, the display consisted of two horizontal
yellow lines passing perpendicularly through the long axis of
a rectangle outlined in magenta, which was presented in the
upright position (Figure 1D). The yellow line on the left served as
the standard while the line on the right served as the comparison,
which was initially presented 57 pixels lower than the standard.
The participant’s task was to align the comparison stimulus to
match the standard. Scores were obtained by calculating the final
difference in pixels between the fixed vertical position of the
standard and the adjusted vertical position of the comparison
stimulus.
In the luminance matching control task, which assessed
luminance discrimination, the display consisted of two gray
squares (Figure 1E). The one on the left had an RGB value
of [128, 128, 128]. This square was the standard. The other,
which served as the comparison stimulus, was presented with an
initial RGB value of [64, 64, 64]. Both squares were 110 pixels
wide. The participant’s task was to adjust the luminance of
the comparison stimulus to match the standard. Scores were
obtained by calculating the final difference in RGB values between
the fixed luminance of the standard and the adjusted luminance
of the comparison stimulus.
The Shepard illusion task consisted of two yellow
parallelograms (Figure 1A). The parallelogram on the left
was oriented vertically while the one on the right was oriented
horizontally. On each trial, one of the parallelograms was
designated as the standard while the other was designated as
the comparison stimulus. The comparison stimulus was initially
presented either 50% smaller or 50% bigger than the standard.
The order of the trials, each representing one of the four possible
starting combinations, was generated randomly. The length of
both parallelograms remained fixed at 180 pixels. The width of
the standard remained fixed at 75 pixels while the width of the
comparison stimulus was adjusted by the participants so that it
matched the standard. The apparent width of the parallelogram
on the left was typically smaller than the one on the right when
both were physically identical.
The participants also completed the RPM, which is a non-
verbal measure of general cognitive ability. In this assessment, the
participant was provided with a booklet of different patterns, with
a piece missing in each pattern. For each item, the participant
was required to select which piece best matched the pattern.
Depending on the age of the child, this assessment usually took
between 15 and 30 min to complete. There were two forms of
the RPM, designed for different age groups. The colored version
was administered to children younger than 10 years, while the
standard version was administered to children over the age of
10 years. Scores on the colored form were converted to standard
scores based on conversion tables in the RPM manual.
Data Analyses
The data were analyzed using JASP software version 0.8
(University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands) and
GraphPad Prism version 7 (GraphPad Software Inc., La Jolla, CA,
United States). Given it is well accepted that some illusions are
stronger than others, perceptual measurements from the illusion
task were normalized to allow for meaningful comparisons
between this study and other studies that have also used
normalized susceptibility measures (Schwarzkopf et al., 2011;
Chouinard et al., 2013, 2017, 2016). Specifically, normalized
indices of illusion strength were calculated as follows: [(Perceived
Size in Configuration A − Perceived Size in Configuration
B) / (Perceived Size in Configuration A + Perceived Size in
Configuration B); configuration A denoting the condition one
would expect to see greater judgements in perceived size]. Based
on this formula, positive values denote perceptual effects in the
expected direction for the illusion while negative values denote
perceptual effects in the opposite direction.
One-sample t-tests against zero were used to measure illusion
strength in each group. In cases when normality could be
assumed according to Shapiro-Wilk tests, independent samples
t-tests were used to investigate differences between groups in
illusory strength as well as performance on the control tasks.
Otherwise, Mann-Whitney tests were performed. In the tables,
we report both uncorrected p-values as well as corrected p-values
for the number of control tasks examined, using the Bonferroni
method (i.e., pcorr = puncorr × 4). Similar corrections were not
applied to the illusion task given we had a clear a priori prediction
based on previous investigations of similar tasks performed in
an adolescent / adult population with ASD (Mitchell et al., 2010)
and a typically developing adult population that varied in autistic
traits (Chouinard et al., 2016). Cohen’s d is reported for illusion
strength.
In addition to null hypothesis statistical testing (NHST),
which does not allow one to draw definite conclusions about
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the viability of the null hypothesis, we calculated Bayes Factors
(BF10) denoting the likelihood of the alternative over the null
hypothesis. Within the framework of Bayesian statistics, one
quantifies the evidence in support for either the alternative or
the null hypothesis relative to the other (Wagenmakers, 2007).
A BF10 value of 3 or more was considered to provide substantial
support for the alternative hypothesis and values less than 0.333
to provide substantial support for the null hypothesis (Jeffreys,
1961). There is no need to correct for multiple Bayes factors given
that they do not reflect probabilities (Gelman et al., 2012). The
Bayes analyses allowed us to determine if a different statistical
approach might converge with NHST, which would provide more
confidence in the findings, and draw more definite inferences
from null results, which NHST is not designed to evaluate.
We calculated the following dependent variables from the eye-
tracking data in the Shepard illusion task that were confined
within the black viewing area shown in Figure 1. Saccade velocity
was calculated by taking the Euclidian distance in pixels between
the X, Y coordinates before and after the saccade and dividing
this number by the duration of the saccade in milliseconds,
expressing the measurement in pixels by milliseconds. Saccade
frequency was calculated by the number of saccades registered by
the Tobii system during data collection divided by total duration
in minutes, expressing the measurement in number of saccades
per minute. Completion time was calculated as the amount of time
in seconds to complete a trial.
We also performed a detailed spatial analysis of the eye-
tracking data. This was carried out by an experienced research
assistant in the lab (KAR) who was blind to participant
identity and group membership. Given the dynamic and self-
paced nature of the visual stimuli in which the comparison
stimulus changed during task performance, the research assistant
played back the eye-tracking recordings in Tobii Pro Studio
(Tobii AB, Danderyd, Sweden) and manually classified each
saccade movement as either standard-to-standard, comparison-
to-comparison, standard-to-comparison, comparison-to-standard,
or other. We express each of these measurements as a percentage
of the total number of saccades made.
We also examined how much time participants spent fixating
on the two stimuli. Two areas-of-interest (AOI) were created
over the standard and comparison stimuli. Each was equal in
area to the largest presentation of the comparison stimulus. From
this, we calculated looking time for each AOI as a percentage of
the total time spent fixating somewhere inside the boundaries of
the black viewing area shown in Figure 1. This was carried out
for both time spent fixating on the standard stimulus and time
spent fixating on the comparison stimulus. We reasoned that more
saccades to and / or more time spent on the standard might mean
that the participant is concentrating more on the stimulus that
they are being asked to base their perceptual judgements, while
more saccades to and / or more time on the comparison might
mean that the participant is concentrating more on the stimulus
that they are being asked to adjust – detracting their attention
away from the standard stimulus.
The eye-tracking data also underwent NHST and Bayesian
analyses. Independent samples t-tests were used to evaluate
differences between groups and Pearson correlations were used
to examine associations between illusory strength and each
of the eye-tracking dependent variables across groups. In the
tables, we report both uncorrected and corrected p-values
adjusted for multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni method
(pcorr = puncorr× 10). Corresponding Bayes factors (BF10) are also
reported. As mentioned previously, there is no need to correct for
multiple Bayes factors (Gelman et al., 2012). Additional analyses
were performed in certain cases to understand further significant
effects (or lack of) obtained from the above analyses. Each of these
extra tests is described in the Results section. Effects obtained
from all analyses were deemed significant at an alpha of 0.05.
RESULTS
Independent samples t-tests demonstrated that there were no
differences in age (t(34) = 0.009, p = 0.993, BF10 = 0.322) and raw
RPM scores (t(34) = 0.044, p = 0.965, BF10 = 0.322) between the
ASD and TD groups (for means and other descriptive statistics,
see Table 1). The male to female ratio was the same for both
groups. Thus, the two groups were matched for age, gender, and
raw RPM scores.
Performance on the Control Tasks
An independent samples t-test demonstrated that performance
on the luminance task between the ASD and TD groups did
not differ (p = 0.341), while Mann-Whitney tests also revealed
no differences between the two groups on the size, shape, and
alignment tasks (all p ≥ 0.341; for more detailed statistics, see
Table 2). Bayesian analysis further demonstrated substantial
support for the null relative to alternative hypothesis in the
shape matching task (BF10 = 0.332) (Table 2). All other BF10
ranged from 0.358 to 0.463 (Table 2). Although none of the
other BF10 values were indicative of substantial support for the
null hypothesis, they were still all below 1 – demonstrating a
TABLE 2 | Performance on the control tasks in the ASD and TD groups.
Mean ASD (SD) Mean TD (SD) t(34) U puncorr pcorr BF10
Size matching (pixel difference) 4.94(7.88) 3.58(3.30) − 131.50 0.341 1 0.385
Shape matching (pixel difference) −0.94(4.25) −0.58(3.30) − 153.50 0.800 1 0.332
Alignment matching (pixel difference) 0.19(0.79) 0.08(0.43) − 163.00 0.983 1 0.358
Luminance matching (RGB increment difference) −4.75(13.18) −1.14(8.80) 0.97 − 0.341 1 0.463
pcorr-values reported in column 7 were corrected for multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni method. Either independent samples t-tests (column 4) or Mann-Whitney
tests (column 5) were performed depending on whether or not normality could be assumed as determined by a Shapiro-Wilk test.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 December 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 2452
fpsyg-09-02452 December 1, 2018 Time: 14:0 # 7
Chouinard et al. Eye-Tracking and the Shepard Illusion in ASD
TABLE 3 | Eye-tracking measures between the ASD and TD groups.
Measurement Mean (SD) ASD Mean (SD) TD t(34) puncorr pcorr BF10
Saccade velocity (pixels / ms) 4.11(0.42) 4.26(0.65) 0.87 0.388 1 0.433
Saccade frequency (n / min) 26.63(12.87) 36.32(15.28) 1.63 0.111 1 0.897
Standard-to-standard saccade (%) 10.09(6.60) 11.36(5.33) 0.63 0.532 1 0.376
Comparison-to-comparison saccade (%) 14.83(6.65) 13.03(5.08) 0.92 0.365 1 0.447
Standard-to-comparison saccade (%) 6.57(4.28) 8.84(4.12) 1.62 0.114 1 0.886
Comparison-to-standard saccade (%) 7.30(3.86) 8.91(4.18) 1.20 0.237 1 0.564
Other type of saccade (%) 61.22(14.77) 57.88(12.31) 0.74 0.466 1 0.398
Time spent fixating on standard (%) 35.72(12.46) 32.97(7.62) 0.80 0.430 1 0.413
Time spent fixating on comparison (%) 40.58(13.43) 46.77(10.89) 1.52 0.138 1 0.782
Completion time (s) 61.25(20.52) 67.47(27.42) 0.77 0.447 1 0.405
pcorr-values reported in column 6 were corrected for multiple correlations using the Bonferroni method.
tendency for more support for the null than the alternative
hypothesis. Thus, the two groups seemed to not differ on the
various perceptual discrimination abilities tested.
Strength of the Shepard Illusion
All participants in the TD group demonstrated a positive
susceptibility index score, indicating that they experienced the
illusion in the expected direction (Figure 2A). In the ASD group,
16 participants had a positive score while 2 participants had
a negative score (Figure 2A). One-sample t-tests demonstrated
that illusion strength was greater than zero in both the ASD
(t(17) = 6.35, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.50, BF10 = 2,936) and
TD (t(17) = 18.32, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 4.32, BF10 > 10,000)
groups. Independent samples t-tests revealed that the ASD group
experienced a weaker illusion than the TD group (t(34) = 2.41,
p = 0.022, Cohen’s d = 0.80, BF10 = 2.81). In short, both groups
experienced seeing the illusion but the ASD group experienced
seeing a weaker one.
Eye Tracking
There were no differences between the ASD and TD groups on
any of the eye tracking measures as revealed by independent
samples t-tests (all p ≥ 0.111; for more detailed statistics, see
Table 3). BF10 ranged from 0.376 to 0.897 (Table 3). Although
none of the BF10 values were indicative of substantial support
for the null hypothesis, they were nevertheless all below 1. This
demonstrates that support for the null hypothesis had a tendency
to be stronger than the alternative hypothesis.
Although we could not find any differences between
group means, the correlation analyses did yield important
results (Table 4; Figures 2B,C). Illusion strength increased as
participants made more saccades between different locations
within the standard stimulus (r(34) = 0.46, p = 0.005, BF10 = 9.236)
(Figure 2B) as well as toward the standard stimulus from the
comparison stimulus (r(34) = 0.48, p = 0.003, BF10 = 12.869)
(Figure 2C). None of the other correlations were significant
(all p ≥ 0.111), including time spent fixating on the standard
stimulus (p = 0.430) (Table 4). Thus, illusion strength increased as
participants actively made more saccades within and toward the
standard stimulus. Simply viewing this same stimulus passively,
as indexed by time spent fixating on it, did not increase illusion
strength.
Linear regression analyses comparing the slopes between the
TD and ASD groups revealed that these correlations seemed to
be driven primarily by the ASD group. Specifically, the slopes
between the two groups differed for saccades between different
locations within the standard stimulus (F(1,32) = 8.87, p = 0.006;
ASD group: r(16) = 0.68, p = 0.002, BF10 = 27.281; TD group:
r(16) = −0.09, p = 0.735, BF10 = 0.307) (Figure 2B) and for
saccades toward the standard stimulus from the comparison
stimulus (F(1,32) = 5.07, p = 0.031; ASD group: r(16) = 0.60,
p = 0.008, BF10 = 7.723; TD group: r(16) = 0.22, p = 0.378,
BF10 = 0.418) (Figure 2C).
In addition to the aforementioned correlations in the overall
sample described above, Bayesian statistics also provided
substantial support for increases in illusion strength as
participants made more saccades toward the comparison
stimulus from the standard one (BF10 = 3.029). The Bayesian
analyses further revealed substantial support for the null
relative to the alternative hypotheses when illusion strength
was correlated with saccade frequency (BF10 = 0.272), time
spent fixating on the standard stimulus (BF10 = 0.208), time
TABLE 4 | Correlations between illusion strength and different eye-tracking
measures.
Correlated with illusion strength r(34) puncorr pcorr BF10
Saccade velocity (pixels / ms) 0.24 0.156 1 0.272
Saccade frequency (n / min) 0.13 0.452 1 0.547
Standard-to-standard saccade (%) 0.46 0.005 ∗0.049 9.236
Comparison-to-comparison saccade (%) −0.25 0.147 1 0.569
Standard-to-comparison saccade (%) 0.39 0.018 0.181 3.029
Comparison-to-standard saccade (%) 0.48 0.003 ∗0.034 12.869
Other type of saccade (%) −0.36 0.030 0.305 1.971
Time spent fixating on standard (%) −0.01 0.972 1 0.208
Time spent fixating on comparison (%) 0.15 0.393 1 0.295
Completion time (s) −0.08 0.630 1 0.232
pcorr-values reported in column 4 were corrected for multiple correlations using the
Bonferroni method. Asterisks (∗) denote significance after corrections for multiple
correlations were made using this method (pcorr < 0.05).
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FIGURE 2 | Illusion strength and correlations with saccadic eye movements to the standard stimulus. The top panel (A) displays each individual’s susceptibility index
score (green circles, ASD group; blue circles, TD group) for the Shepard illusion. The lines represent the means for each group. As shown in the graph, we found a
significant reduction in the ASD relative to the TD group. The other plots demonstrate the strength of the Shepard illusion as a function of the percentage of
saccades that were classified as starting from one location to a different location within the standard stimulus (B) and classified as starting from one location on the
comparison stimulus to a location on the standard stimulus (C). In both instances, the overall correlations (in black) were significant after correcting for multiple
comparisons using the Bonferroni method (p < 0.05). Additional linear regression analyses revealed that these correlations were primarily driven by the ASD group.
Specifically, in both cases, the slopes between the two groups were different from each other (p < 0.05), positively correlated in the ASD group (p < 0.05; in green),
and not correlated at all in the TD group (p ≥ 0.378; in blue).
spent fixating on the comparison stimulus (BF10 = 0.295), and
completion times (BF10 = 0.232).
We performed ANOVA with Saccade Type (standard-to-
standard vs. comparison-to-standard vs. standard-to-comparison
vs. comparison-to-standard) and Group (ASD vs. TD) to further
explore scan patterns in the Shepard illusion and how they
might differ between groups. There was a main effect of
Saccade Type (F(3,102) = 15.17, p < 0.001) but not of Group
(F(1,34) = 0.54, p = 0.466). The Saccade Type×Group interaction
was not significant (F(3,102) = 1.51, p = 0.216). Figure 3A
shows the main effect of Saccade Type. t-tests, corrected for
multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni method, revealed that
participants tended to make more saccades within than between
stimuli. Specifically, they made more standard-to-standard than
standard-to-comparison saccades (p = 0.035, BF10 = 6.70) and
more comparison-to-comparison saccades than both standard-
to-comparison (p < 0.001, BF10 = 5,450.12) and comparison-
to-standard (p < 0.001, BF10 = 975.66) saccades. All other
pairwise comparisons were not significant (p ≥ 0.059). Bayesian
analyses further revealed substantial support for an increase in
standard-to-standard relative to comparison-to-standard saccades
(BF10 = 4.29) and substantial support against differences between
standard-to-comparison and comparison-to-standard saccades
(BF10 = 0.32). Bayesian testing for differences (or lack of) between
standard-to-standard and comparison-to-comparison saccades
was inconclusive (BF10 = 2.08).
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FIGURE 3 | Proportion of saccade types made and time spent looking at
AOIs. Participants tended to make more saccades within than between the
stimuli as denoted by the asterisks (∗) in panel A. Looking times were longer
for the comparison compared to the standard stimulus, as shown in panel B.
Asterisks (∗) denote significant differences after correcting for multiple
comparisons using the Bonferroni method (p < 0.05). S-to-C refers to
standard-to-comparison saccades and C-to-S refers to
comparison-to-standard saccades.
We also performed ANOVA with AOI Looking Time
(standard vs. comparison) and Group (ASD vs. TD). There was
a main effect of AOI Looking Time (F(1,34) = 8.64, p = 0.006),
whereby participants spent more time looking at the comparison
than the standard stimulus (Figure 3B), no main effect of Group
(F(1,34) = 1.98, p = 0.168), and no AOI Looking Time × Group
interaction (F(1,34) = 0.71, p = 0.404).
DISCUSSION
We measured the strength of the Shepard illusion in ASD and TD
children and tested if different eye-tracking measurements could
predict group differences in illusion strength. We hypothesized
that children with ASD would exhibit reduced illusion strength.
Replicating previous work in older samples, this hypothesis was
confirmed. We also hypothesized that the reduced susceptibility
in ASD would be explained by differences in eye-movements.
This hypothesis was refuted. None of the eye-tracking measures
yielded mean differences between groups, which rules out the
possibility that abilities to shift attention (as indexed by saccade
velocity and saccade frequency), attended location (as indexed
by the remaining eye tracking measures), and task engagement
(as indexed by completion times) could explain the mean group
difference in illusion strength. However, actively scanning the
standard stimulus, as indexed by saccadic movements, enhanced
illusion strength more strongly in the ASD than the TD group.
Thus, although both groups actively attended to the standard
stimulus to the same degree, the ASD group would have perhaps
experienced the illusion to the same degrees as the TD group had
they actively scanned this stimulus even more than they (and the
TD group) did.
In addition, performance on the control matching tasks did
not reveal any group differences, ruling out the possibility
that the group difference in illusion strength was due to
visual discrimination abilities. Moreover, both the ASD and TD
children were matched for gender, age, and raw RPM scores,
ruling out the possibility that the group difference in Shepard
illusion strength was due to gender, chronological age, or non-
verbal cognitive abilities. By the process of elimination, we are
left to conclude that the two groups integrate similar visual
information differently, which ultimately leads to differences in
illusion strength. As we discuss below, this processing likely
relates to specific kinds of high-level perceptual mechanisms.
Another important finding was the presence of greater illusion
strength in participants who actively directed their attention most
to the standard stimulus.
Earlier Research on the Shepard Illusion
in ASD
The presence of group differences in the strength of the Shepard
illusion is consistent with earlier work (Mitchell et al., 2010;
Chouinard et al., 2016). We have confirmed in a sample of ASD
children the same findings that Mitchell et al. (2010) reported
in an older sample of ASD participants between the ages of 12
and 29 years (M = 21.1, SD = 5.0). Namely, the Shepard illusion
was reduced in ASD relative to TD individuals. Our results
are also consistent with a previous study that demonstrated a
reduction in the strength to the Shepard illusion as a function of
autistic traits in the TD adult population (Chouinard et al., 2016).
Interestingly, Chouinard et al. (2016) reported that the subscale
of the AQ that correlated most strongly with the illusion was
the Imagination subscale (r = −0.23; i.e., the illusion decreased
with levels of imagination given that imagination is restricted in
ASD), while the Attention to Detail subscale correlated the least
(r = −0.06). In light of these findings, Chouinard et al. (2016)
argued for the importance of high-level integration mechanisms.
Indeed, it is known that the illusion becomes stronger when
multiple contextual elements are added to the display. For
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example, adding legs to the parallelograms to make them look like
tabletops strengthens the illusion (Mitchell et al., 2010). Also, the
incorporation of additional texture gradients, such as a wooden
grain, makes the apparent differences in tabletops even more
pronounced (Tyler, 2011).
The Relevance of the Eye-Tracking
Measurements
None of the eye-tracking measures yielded group differences.
This has important implications. First, it suggests that abilities to
move the eyes and shift attention between different parts of the
display were intact in the ASD group. It is conceivable that both
saccade velocities and saccade frequencies would be reduced in the
ASD relative to the TD group if this were not the case (Schmitt
et al., 2014). Second, it suggests that children with ASD directed
their attention to different parts of the visual scene in a similar
manner as the TD children. In other words, having an ASD did
not determine where a child looked in the visual scene. Together,
we can rule out that the group difference in illusion strength was
due to abilities in shifting attention and where the children were
allocating their attention within the scene.
The reported correlations between the strength of the Shepard
illusion and the proportion of saccades made within and toward
the standard stimulus are also informative (Figures 2B,C). They
demonstrate that the children who made more saccades within
and toward the standard stimulus experienced the illusion more
strongly. Namely, participants who explored this stimulus more
were less veridical in their perceptual experience. Perhaps it is
the case that the children who explored the standard more found
the percept more interesting, causing the illusion to be stronger,
while those who focused more attention elsewhere were less
interested. Alternatively, it could be the case that illusion strength
causes one to explore the standard more because the illusion itself
grabs a child’s attention. Namely, children who experience the
illusion more strongly will be more interested in the standard
than children who experience the illusion less. Either way, our
findings indicate that having an ASD did not predict the degree
to which a child would focus their gaze on the standard stimulus.
The group means were not statistically different.
However, linear regression analyses comparing the slope of
these correlations between the ASD and TD groups revealed
that these effects were more prominent in the former group.
This is illustrated by the green (ASD children) and blue (TD
children) circles in Figures 2B,C. These findings are more
difficult to interpret. Perhaps the effects of attending less to
the standard stimulus is exacerbated in ASD relative to TD
individuals. Alternatively, the differences in slopes could be
driven by greater variability in illusion strength in the former
group and a ceiling effect in the latter. Future experiments can
examine these possibilities further. Nonetheless, the findings
indicate that the ASD group might benefit more from actively
moving their eyes within and toward the standard stimulus.
Strategies that may aid ASD individuals to see this illusion more
strongly could have them make more directed eye movements.
It was also interesting to see that the number of saccades
made within and toward the standard stimulus predicted illusion
strength, while looking time to the same stimulus did not.
We believe that this is because the former measurement may
reflect more active scrutiny of the stimulus than the latter.
Processing the contextual effects provided by the standard
stimulus may require an active exploration to different parts
of the stimulus rather than maintaining fixation on only a few
segments for a prolonged period of time. This finding contradicts
an earlier finding from our lab demonstrating a reduction in the
strength of the vertical-horizontal illusion when participants were
tasked to move their eyes more across the display (Chouinard
et al., 2017). We reconcile this discrepancy by suggesting that
the vertical-horizontal illusion may depend more on low-level
visual processing, whereby greater retinal stability facilitates the
processing of perceptual effects. In contrast, the Shepard illusion
may depend more on higher-level visual processing in which
the registration of multiple contextual elements in different
spatial locations of the scene is important in driving the illusion.
Indeed, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the Shepard
illusion is highly dependent on high-level cognitive processing
(Chouinard et al., 2016) and may therefore require more active
exploration.
A final note should be raised about null inferences. NHST is
not designed to do this – it is only designed to reject the null
hypothesis. Conversely, Bayesian statistics enables one to infer
whether or not the null hypothesis is supported in cases when
NHST did not reject it. However, the Bayesian factors we report
in some of these instances are inconclusive (i.e., above 0.33). One
should treat these cases with caution.
Why Are Children With ASD Less
Susceptible to the Shepard Illusion?
The following questions then arise: Why are children with ASD
less susceptible to the Shepard illusion and what does this tell
us about perceptual styles in ASD? As discussed previously, it
cannot be because of abilities in shifting attention (given that
saccade velocities and saccade frequencies were the same between
groups), where participants directed their attention (given that
the remaining eye-tracking measurements also did not reveal
group differences), visual discrimination abilities (given the
results of the control tasks), and non-verbal cognitive abilities
as well as level of engagement (given that both groups were
matched on the RPM and completed the task in the same amount
of time). By the process of elimination, we are left to conclude
that the perceptual differences in ASD are more likely driven by
how information is integrated for creating a perception – not
by what information is gathered nor by abilities to gather this
information nor by intelligence. In the past, we have offered three
possible explanations to explain why the Shepard illusion might
be diminished in ASD (Chouinard et al., 2016). We will briefly
summarize each one of them.
The first relates to shape processing. Badcock and his
colleagues have demonstrated how abilities in shape processing
can be substantially different in ASD (Grinter et al., 2010;
Almeida et al., 2014). However, we could not demonstrate any
evidence for this in our shape matching control task given that
both groups performed the task to the same level. Admittedly,
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our control task is not as sensitive for detecting differences in
shape processing as the more sophisticated paradigms with radial
frequency patterns used by Badcock and his colleagues. Hence,
we believe that shape processing and how this relates to the
Shepard illusion could still be a promising avenue for future
research.
The second relates to mental rotation. The mechanisms
of the Shepard illusion are unknown but it is tempting to
infer that they might involve mental rotation. After all, the
illusion consists of the same shape oriented in two different
ways and it was first described by Shepard (1990), who was
a pioneer in mental rotation research. In addition, males
are reported to be better than females on mental rotation
tasks (Voyer et al., 1995) and it has been argued that ASD
could be an extreme manifestation of a male brain (Baron-
Cohen, 2002). Hence, it could be the case that the ASD
participants in our study were better at mental rotation and
could see the parallelogram as having the same dimensions
when presented in two different orientations. However, the
evidence for enhanced mental rotation abilities in ASD remains
inconsistent and controversial (Soulières et al., 2011; Beacher
et al., 2012; McGrath et al., 2012) – indicating that further
research on mental rotation and the Shepard illusion in ASD is
required.
The third relates to the integration of within-contextual
properties. Geometric illusions can be grossly lumped into
two classes: between-object and within-object illusions (Ben-
Shalom and Ganel, 2012). In between-object illusions, such
as the well-known Ebbinghaus illusion (Titchener, 1901), the
target stimulus is physically separated from the elements in
the background that provide context. In contrast, for within-
objects illusions, such as the Shepard illusion, it is the
various characteristics of the target stimulus itself (e.g., its
length and width) that provides context. Our earlier research
demonstrates how illusion strength in TD adult populations
decreases more strongly as a function of autistic traits for
within-object illusions, such as the Shepard illusion, than
they do for between-object illusions (Chouinard et al., 2013,
2016).
Most illusions can be considered intermediates between these
two classes of illusions, some of which have yielded more
inconsistencies with regards to susceptibility in ASD than the
Shepard illusion. For example, Ropar and Mitchell (1999), Bölte
et al. (2007), and Manning et al. (2017) have demonstrated
increases in the strength of the Müller-Lyer illusion in ASD,
while a number of studies have not (Happé, 1996; Ropar and
Mitchell, 2001; Hoy et al., 2004; Ishida et al., 2009). Likewise,
Happé (1996), Bölte et al. (2007), and Ishida et al. (2009) have
demonstrated decreases in the strength of the Ponzo illusion in
ASD, while a number of studies have not (Ropar and Mitchell,
1999, 2001; Hoy et al., 2004). In addition, Ropar and Mitchell
(1999) demonstrated decreases in the vertical-horizontal illusion,
which they did not replicate in a later study (Ropar and Mitchell,
2001). Perhaps, these inconsistencies relate to the processing of
both between- and within- contextual elements present in these
illusions in which the latter but not the former might be affected
by ASD.
These inconsistencies further underscore how perceptual
styles in ASD might be driven by some kind of high-level
integration mechanism yet to be identified as opposed to
a more general break-down and / or a non-preference for
global integration as posited by several theories reviewed in
the Introduction [EPF theory (Mottron et al., 2006), WCC
theory (Happé and Frith, 2006), and Bayesian-based explanations
(Pellicano and Burr, 2012)], as well as emerging ideas that sensory
processing is aberrant in ASD from the earliest stages of sensory
processing (Robertson and Baron-Cohen, 2017), including dorsal
stream processing (Spencer et al., 2000; Robertson et al., 2012). If
these notions were correct then one would expect to see more
consistencies across studies examining perceptual processes in
ASD – which we consider highly inconsistent. The reduction
of illusion strength in the Shepard illusion is one of only a few
examples of consistent findings across studies.
Implications
The findings of the current study converge with other earlier
studies demonstrating reduced strength of the Shepard illusion
in an older sample with ASD (Mitchell et al., 2010) and as a
function of autistic traits in the adult TD population (Chouinard
et al., 2016). For the first time, we acquired eye-tracking data
as individuals with ASD performed illusion tasks. The use of
eye-tracking enabled us to more confidently rule out a number
of competing explanations. We conclude that the reasons as
to why the Shepard illusion is reduced in children with an
ASD are perceptual rather attentional. The reduced strength
of the Shepard illusion in ASD does not appear to be driven
by how this population allocates attention but rather how they
might integrate visual information for the purposes of creating a
perceptual experience.
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